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How uncertainty influences the decisions of firms to undertake investment projects is a 
fundamental issue in the investment literature. Theory offers models that predict increases in 
uncertainty can either raise or lower investment with a particularly influential line of research 
being the real options theory.TPF
1
FPT  Specifically, Dixit and Pindyck [1994] describe a theory of 
investment that focuses on the irreversibility inherent in many capital projects and the effect of 
uncertainty on the timing of irreversible investment projects.  In their model, uncertainty in the 
future profitability of an investment project that is irreversible, or partially irreversible, may cause 
a firm to delay the investment in order to obtain additional information on the profitability of the 
project.  Dixit and Pindyck [1994] refer to this as ‘the option value of waiting to invest’ and firms 
consider this ‘option’ when making investment decisions.  Increases in uncertainty, increase the 
option value of waiting in this environment.  The result of which is a delay in investment. In this 
paper, we empirically examine the uncertainty-investment relationship by investigating how the 
timing of capital projects responds to changes in the volatility of input and output prices.TPF
2
FPT 
Although there exists a large empirical literature looking at the uncertainty-investment 
relationship, relatively few studies have investigated the effect of uncertainty on the timing of 
specific investment projects (Favero et al [1994], Hurn and Wright [1994] and Bulan, Mayer and 
Somerville [2006]).  This paper examines uncertainty and the timing of investment projects at 
individual US oil refineries.  We believe this is a good testing ground of the uncertainty-
investment relationship for three reasons.  First, investments that involve refinery expansion will 
include a significant fraction of sunk costs.  The investment in capacity expansion in refineries is 
largely composed of structures that are usually engineered and integrated into an existing 
production facility. Once in place a refinery cannot easily divest itself of such a capacity 
                                                 
TP
1
PT Hartmann [1972] and Abel [1983] develop models where greater uncertainty in input or output prices 
actually increases the likelihood a firm invests. 
TP
2
PT For a complete survey on recent development in the investment under uncertainty literature, see Carruth et 
al. [2000].   2
expansion project without bearing significant costs. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that a 
significant fraction of such investment is irreversible.  Second, firms in the industry change their 
capacity in discrete investment and disinvestment bursts. Episodes of high investment activity are 
interspersed with episodes of zero investment activity. This pattern in US refineries is similar, 
though more stark, to those found in recent empirical papers that document the lumpy nature of 
plant and firm-level investment (Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (hereafter CHP [1999], Doms 
and Dunne [1998], and Nilsen and Schiantarelli [2003]).TPF
3
FPT  The discrete nature of investment in 
this industry allows us to look at the timing of capital projects and thus we will be able to see if 
firms delay investment when uncertainty rises.  Third, the industry has well developed 
commodity future markets for its main input, crude oil, and its main outputs, heating oil and 
gasoline.  We compute a forward refining margin from these futures prices and use the volatility 
of the forward refining margin to proxy for uncertainty in the economic environment in which 
refiners must make investment decisions.    
Our data include annual observations on refining capacities for almost all US refineries in 
existence over the period 1985-2003.  We use year-to-year changes in capacities to identify when 
firms undertake capital projects. The data measure only investment activities that affect refinery 
capacity. These capacity-based data omit maintenance-driven investment and non-capacity 
changing investments such as investment in pollution control equipment.  In the case of 
environmental investments which are important in this industry, the timing of these kinds of 
investment is likely to be quite unrelated to the firm’s optimal capital adjustment problem 
discussed in the literature.  By using physical capacity measures, we reduce these types of 
measurement problems and improve our ability to measure the timing of capital projects.TPF
4
FPT   
The first part of our empirical analysis documents capital adjustment patterns in the US 
petroleum refining industry.  We find that capacity adjustments by refiners are very infrequent.  
                                                 
TP
3
PT An early discussion of nonconvex adjustment costs is provided in Rothschild [1971]. 
TP
4
PT Two other recent studies use capacity changes to measure investment in the literature, Bell and Campa 
[1997] and Goolsbee and Gross [2000].   3
Approximately three-quarters of the year-to-year changes in capacity are zero.  This pattern of 
inactivity in the investment data is consistent with models of irreversibility, as well as models that 
stress the presence of fixed adjustment costs (CHP [1999] and Cooper and Haltiwanger (hereafter 
CH [2006])). The second part of the empirical analysis explores the relationship between 
uncertainty in oil markets and capacity adjustment.  We estimate a hazard model to examine the 
relationship between uncertainty, as measured by the volatility of forward refining margins, and 
the probability a refinery undertakes an investment project.  We find that increases in uncertainty 
are associated with delays in capital investment projects.   Our results are robust to a variety of 
adjustment thresholds and hazard specifications.   
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes some basic features of 
the refining industry and the data that we use in the paper. In section III we discuss our measures 
of uncertainty. Section IV provides a description of the empirical methods used and presents our 
findings. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. Investment in the Refining Industry 
In order to examine how uncertainty affects the timing of investment, we utilize data on 
changes in capacity at US refineries to identify when investment projects are undertaken.   
Typically, studies use accounting data on investment expenditures as the basis of their empirical 
analyses. However, relying on such accounting data is not without drawbacks. Accounting data 
on new investment contain a mix of capital expenditures that include expansion-driven spending, 
maintenance-driven spending and non-capacity enhancing investments such as pollution control 
and occupational safety equipment.  In the latter case, these may be mandated investments due to 
regulatory requirements – a situation common in the refining sector.  Mandated investments and 
maintenance-driven investments are driven by forces distinct from the firm’s decision to expand 
or contract its capacity to produce output. Accounting data rarely allow the researcher to 
discriminate among these alternative investment categories.  Caballero [2000] emphasizes the   4
importance of distinguishing between maintenance-driven and expansion-driven investments 
when modeling investment dynamics.  In addition, accounting data on firm- and plant-level 
investments almost always show that producers make investments in every time period, even if at 
a very low level.  Investment spikes are often surrounded by periods of positive but low levels of 
investment activity.  This makes measuring the timing of the investment spike more difficult and 
potentially obscures the discrete nature of the investment process. In this work, we reduce some 
of these problems by studying changes in actual capacities.  
We use the petroleum refinery capacity data from the ‘Petroleum Supply Annual’ published 
by the Energy Information Administration (EIA), Department of Energy.  Beginning in 1980, the 
EIA implemented a mandatory annual survey of refinery capacities except for the period of 1995-
1997 during which the survey was done biennially. It surveys both crude oil processing 
(distillation) capacity and downstream capacities for all operable refineries located in the 50 U.S. 
states, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam and other U.S. possessions. To fill in the missing 
data in 1995 and 1997, we supplement the EIA data by a private survey of refining capacities in 
1995 and 1997 from the Oil & Gas Journal (OGJ).TPF
5
FPT  Because our primary uncertainty measure is 
derived from commodity futures market and unleaded gasoline futures markets did not exist 
before December 1984, our time period of analysis runs from 1985 to 2003. The final data set 
contains 224 refineries with a total of 3307 refinery-year observations.  
Refining capacity (atmospheric distillation capacity) is measured as the ‘the maximum 
number of barrels of input (mainly crude oil) that a distillation facility can process within a 24-
hour period when running at full capacity under optimal crude and product slate conditions with 
no allowance for downtime’ (EIA [2000], pp 165-166).  Under this definition, a refiner’s capacity 
is measured as barrels per stream day (B/SD).  Figure 1 presents the total refining capacity and 
the number of refineries in the US from 1985 to 2004. The number of refineries falls steadily 
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5
PT The OGJ data only reports capacities measured in calendar days (barrels per calendar day or B/CD). We 
multiply the EIA 1994 data (B/SD) by the percentage change in OGJ data to obtain the 1995 data, and 
similarly for 1997 data.    5
while the overall US refining capacity increases by 8%.  Smaller refineries have closed while 
larger refiners have, on average, expanded their size over time.   
Year-to-year changes in refinery capacity are used to define our investment events. 
Refiners increase their capacities through conventional capital project (e.g., adding a catalytic 
cracking unit) and through debottlenecking investments which are smaller investments that 
increase refining capacities but do not alter the number of processing units (EIA Staff report, 
[1999]).   Debottlenecking is usually accomplished at the same time as maintenance and repair. 
The additional capacity gained through debottlenecking is termed ‘capacity creep’ in the industry. 
Given that debottlenecking can be done at small cost, one might expect refineries to frequently 
adjust their capacities.   However, as depicted below, this is not the case. Capacity reductions at 
ongoing refineries also occur in our data but at a much lower frequency than capacity expansions 
with a significant number of such events being refinery closures.  In the empirical work that 
follows we focus primarily on the decision of a refinery to expand capacity.TPF
6
FPT   
The distribution of refinery-level capacity changes are shown in Figure 2.   The underlying 
data represent the percentage change in capacity between two years in the data.  The large spike 
in the middle of the distribution indicates that 74 percent of the time refineries make no change in 
capacity between years.  In addition, a significant number (11 percent) of non-zero observations 
are in the interval of (-0.05, +0.05). These patterns in capacity adjustment are even ‘lumpier’ than 
those reported in CHP [1999], Doms and Dunne [1998], and Nilsen and Schiantarelli [2003].   
For example, Nilsen and Schiantarelli [2003] report zero investment episodes in Norwegian 
manufacturing account for 21 percent of total observations for equipment and 61 percent for 
buildings and Doms and Dunne [1998] state “…while a significant portion of investment occurs 
in a relatively small number of episodes, plants still invest in every period.”  Moreover, the 
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6
PT We also estimate hazard models that use two-sided changes in capacity to identify the end of an 
investment inactivity spell.  The results on uncertainty carry through to that analysis as well and are 
reported in Table IV below. However, using capacity expansion episodes to define the end of a spell is 
more line with the recent work reported in CHP [1999] and Nilsen and Schiantarelli [2003].   6
additional capacity added in the industry is concentrated in a few investment episodes.  Thirty-
three projects account for roughly 30 percent of the total addition to capacity that occurred in the 
industry throughout the period of study.  These additions occur in ongoing refineries since no new 
refineries have been built in the US during our period of analysis.  Alternatively, the large 
reductions in capacity observed in the data are due largely to the closure of refineries –– 83 
refineries shut down during the 1985-2003 period.  
While it is plausible that a refinery may increase its capacity by a small amount through 
debottlenecking and incremental investment activity, we suspect that some of the small changes 
in capacities might be a result of either reporting errors or may reflect the fact that refinery 
engineers adjust the estimates of the capacity levels at their refinery based upon their ongoing 
review of the data.TPF
7
FPT   To test the sensitivity of our results to the presence of these small 
adjustments in capacity, we employ two sets of alternative thresholds to identify whether an 
investment episode has occurred.  The first set includes three relative thresholds based on the 
annual percent change in capacity at a refinery: a zero percent threshold, a five percent threshold, 
and a ten percent threshold. The second set includes two absolute capacity change thresholds: a 
2000 B/SD threshold and a 4000 B/SD threshold.TPF
8
FPT   Investment episodes are then identified as 
investments events that cross these thresholds.  For example, under the zero percent threshold 
there are 835 investment episodes in our data, while under the more restrictive ten percent 
threshold, there are only 400 investment episodes. 
Theories emphasizing the role of irreversibility imply that a refiner will put off investment 
decisions at times of high uncertainty. To shed light on the timing of investments, Figure 3 
presents a histogram of durations from completed investment spells using the zero and the five 
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PT While somewhat arbitrary, the 2000 B/SD and 4000 B/SD thresholds correspond roughly to a five percent 
and ten percent investment in the median sized refinery in 1985 – the first year of our sample.  Moreover, 
it’s unlikely that a capacity increase over 2000 B/SD would simply due to reporting errors while a 4000 
B/SD capacity change would represent a substantial investment.     7
percent thresholds.TPF
9
FPT  The duration is defined as the length of time, in years, between investment 
episodes in a refinery.  If a refinery invests in both year k and year k+1, the duration is zero. If it 
does not invest in year k+1 but invests in year k and k+2, the duration is one.  Several points are 
worth making. First, consistent with the large number of zero observations in Figure 2, the 
majority of the durations are above zero and the median duration for the five percent threshold 
series is 3.5 years.  Second, there are a significant number of zero duration events.  This may be 
due to the fact that refinery investment episodes may span calendar years in the data.  In this case, 
refiners would report back-to-back years of capacity expansions.  These back-to-back capacity 
additions represent a substantially lower fraction of durations under the five percent definition 
perhaps indicating that refineries may undergo some additional capacity fine-tuning in the wake 
of an initial capacity expansion.  These additional fine-tunings in capacity would appear under a 
zero percent threshold definition but not register as a capacity expansion episode under the five 
percent threshold. 
 
III. Measuring Uncertainty 
A measure of uncertainty should gauge agents’ assessments of the distribution of future 
returns.  Prior industry-level studies have often used information on the volatility of industry-
level input and output prices to measure uncertainty in the economic environment (Ghosal and 
Loungani [1996] and Bell and Campa [1997]). Alternatively, firm-level studies often rely on 
stock price volatility as a measure of the uncertainty facing the firm (Leahy and Whited [1996], 
Henly et al [2003], Bloom et al [2007]).  Our approach will focus on industry-level uncertainty 
using data on inputs and outputs that are related specifically to the future profitability of the 
refining sector.  
                                                 
TP
9
PT Here we dropped the ‘censored’ observations. For example, if the last investment episode was observed in 
2000, then the observations of 2001-2003 are dropped.    8
TThe refining process involves distillation which ‘cracks’ crude oil into different 
components to make petroleum products such as gasoline and heating oil. CTrude oil, gasoline and 
heating oil are all actively traded in the futures market in the New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX). Our uncertainty measure is based on a daily forward refining margin (or crack spread, 
denoted as FRM), which is defined as  
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P  denotes the price of the futures contract that is traded at day d and matures at 
month M.TPF
10
FPT  TTThe 3-2-1 refining margin reflects the gross profit from processing three barrels of 
crude oil into two barrels of unleaded gasoline and one barrel of heating oil. Because the 3:2:1 
ratio approximates the real-world ratio of refinery output, it is commonly used in the oil industry 
to construct the refining margin. An EIA report (EIA [2002], pp. 21-22) notes thatT “RTefinery 
managers are more concerned about the difference between their input and output prices than 
about the level of prices. Refiners’ profits are tied directly to the spread, or difference, between 
the price of crude oil and the prices of refined products. Because refiners can reliably predict their 
costs other than crude oil, the spread is their major uncertainty.” 
A common interpretation of commodity futures prices describes the futures prices as a 
forecast of the future spot price of a commodity that incorporates a risk premium (Fama and 
French [1987]).  In a recent study about predictive ability of commodity futures prices, Chinn, 
LeBlanc and Coibion [2005] show that futures prices for crude oil, gasoline and heating oil are 
unbiased predictors of future spot prices and outperform time-series models.TPF
11
FPT  These findings 
agree with earlier analysis by Ma [1989], Tomek [1997] and Fujihara and Mougoue [1997].  For 
this reason, the futures prices are generally considered as a benchmark price forecast by many 
industry observers and risk managers rely on these petroleum futures to hedge their price risks 
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10
PT The deliveries of all petroleum futures are ratable over the entire delivery month (NYMEX website). 
TP
11
PT However, they also show that futures prices are not very accurate predictors of future spot prices.   9
(EIA [2002], pp. 20). Thus, we believe an uncertainty measure constructed from the forward 
refining margins is a reasonable proxy for the uncertainty faced by refiners in forecasting future 
profitability.  
Analogous to papers using the standard deviation of stock returns, this paper uses the 
annual standard deviation of the daily forward refining margin as our uncertainty indicator. The 
NYMEX began trading crude oil futures in March 1983, unleaded gasoline futures in December 
1984, and heating oil futures in January 1980. The daily forward refining margin of (1) is 
calculated using daily closing prices of all the three commodity contracts with six months time-
to-maturity. The six-month maturity is chosen because it is the longest time horizon with which 
we can obtain a consistent data series. The annual measures of forward refining margin and the 
associated uncertainty measure are the mean and the standard deviation, respectively, of daily 
forward margins as defined in (1) over a 12-month window and deflated with the implicit GDP 
deflator from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  
To allow for construction lags and to check the robustness of our empirical results, we 
construct three alternative measures of the mean and standard deviation of the forward refining 
margin by varying the calculation window. The first definition is based on the mean and the 
standard deviation of daily margins in the contemporary year y. The second and the third 
definitions build in six- and three- month lags, respectively.  Throughout the analysis below we 
report the results from the six-month lag definition but the findings are generally robust across the 
alternative windows. 
Figure 4 plots the mean and standard deviation of the forward refining margin according to 
the six-month lag definition for the period 1985-2003. The uncertainty series appears to be 
heavily influenced by geopolitical events in the Middle East. The spike in 1991 which is the 
standard deviation of the FRM from July 1, 1990 to June 30, 1991 is related to the first Gulf-War. 
It rises again in 2003 surrounding the second Gulf War. Given the importance of Persian Gulf in   10
the world oil supply, it is not surprising that investors are less certain about future refining 
margins during periods when war threatens important supply sources. 
 
IV. Investment and Uncertainty 
 
U The Empirical Framework  
Given our data features discrete bursts of investment interspersed with periods of inactivity, 
we make use of econometric techniques for survival analysis and estimate the effect of 
uncertainty on the timing of investment projects.  Following the empirical approach of CHP 
[1999], Gelos and Isgut [2001] and Nilsen and Schiantarelli [2003], we estimate a discrete hazard 
model. Let T denote the length of a spell that a refinery stays in an inaction regime with the 
cumulative probability distribution function F(t). The probability that a refinery stays in an 
inaction regime longer than T is given by the survival function S(t)=1-F(t)=Pr(T>t). The hazard 
function gives the conditional probability that a refinery increases its capacity by more than the 
threshold value in the interval of ∆t after it stays in inaction until t. Using the notation of Kiefer 
[1988], the hazard function can be written as 
(2) 
t
t T t t T t pr
t
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In our application, an inaction spell is exited by an investment episode exceeding the 
relevant threshold. Spells that end through refinery closures are censored and capacity reductions 
of ongoing operations do not result in the exit of a spell. Most refineries have multiple investment 
episodes during the sample period and we reset an individual refinery’s clock to zero after each 
episode. Some refineries were in an ongoing inaction spell at the start of the sample period. For   11
these refineries, we identify their last investment episode before 1985 and use this information to 
initialize the current spell length in 1985.  
The recent literature on the cost of capital adjustments (CHP [1999], CH [2006]) argues 
that positive duration dependence is consistent with non-convex forms of adjustment costs.  The 
reason is that under the assumption of non-convex costs of adjustment (say, a fixed cost), the 
likelihood of net gains from a new investment being able to justify the fixed cost increases in the 
time since the last investment.  This is due to the fact that in the CHP [1999] model the difference 
in the productivity of a firm’s existing capital stock and new investment grows in time since the 
last investment.  When the productivity difference between the new capital and the firm’s existing 
vintage of capital becomes large enough, firms invest.  In contrast, under convex adjustment costs, 
the best response is to invest whenever there is a capital shortage. This yields positive correlation 
in producer-level investment series and the prediction of negative duration dependence in the 
hazard, though one should not observe lumpy investment.   Models with irreversibility also yield 
positive correlations in investment and the prediction of negative duration dependence in the 
hazard (Bigsten et al [2005]). However, there is a key difference between the irreversibility and 
convex adjustment cost models. Models of irreversibility imply episodes of investment inactivity 
interspersed with periods of investment and this is not the case in convex adjustment cost models 
where firms smooth investment across periods. 
The discrete hazard is parameterized using a complementary log-log function: 
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t
iy tiy t x D x t t t T x t β γ ϕ β λ             
where φ is the intercept. γ’s and β’s are the coefficients to be estimated. DBtiy  
Bis a set of duration 
dummies, equal to 1 if year y is the tth year from the last investment episode for refinery i.TPF
12
FPT S 
denotes the longest spell duration. DB1iy  
Bis the omitted category. From the estimated γ’s, one can 
construct a non-parametric estimation of the baseline hazard. If the γ’s are increasing, then the 
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12
PT For example, if an investment episode occurs in year y, then t is equal to 1 in year y+1.    12
baseline hazard has positive duration dependence. That is, the probability of exiting a spell 
increases as the time elapsed from the last investment episode increases. On the other hand, 
declining γ’s indicate negative duration dependence, meaning the probability of undertaking an 
investment project decreases as the duration of the inactivity spell rises.  x Biy
B is a vector of 
explanatory variables. The marginal effect of x on the hazard is exp(-exp(x’β))·exp(x’β)β, so the 
sign of the estimated β gives the directional effect of the x variable on the hazard function. A 
positive β means the hazard increases in x, and vice versa.  
The variables contained in x include both the margin and uncertainty variables discussed 
above and a number of additional variables. We control for the overall capacity utilization rate in 
the refining district to proxy for supply conditions in an area.TPF
13
FPT The variable is measured as the 
ratio of average daily input (crude) to average daily capacity in a refining district and enters the 
empirical specification with a one year lag..  We expect that if supply conditions are tight in an 
area this may increase the probability that a refinery expands capacity. Since, Doms and Dunne 
[1998] find that smaller plants tend to have lumpier investment patterns than larger plants, a 
dummy variable that is equal to one for refineries with capacities less than 50,000 B/SD and zero 
otherwise is included in the model.TPF
14
FPT To control for geographic and institutional differences 
across regions, a set of dummy variables for refining districts is also included in the model.TPF
15
FPT  
The refining industry is one of the most heavily polluting industries and is subject to a 
number of environmental regulations. Using plant data from the Longitudinal Research Database, 
Becker and Henderson [2000] find that the differential air quality regulations reduce new plant 
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PT A complete description and map for refining districts can be found in EIA’s annual publication 
Petroleum Supply Annual.  
TP
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PT 50,000 B/SD is a standard industry definition for small refinery and is used by Kerr and Newell [2003]. 
TP
15
PT Doms and Dunne [1998] find that plants undergoing ownership change have lumpier investment patterns.  
However, we didn’t find the ownership change to have a significant effect on the hazard in our data. We 
also investigated the possible effect of business cycle on the hazard shape by including yearly dummies for 
the two recession years (1990 and 2001) during this period and find no evidence that the hazard in 
recession years differs significantly from other years.   13
births in ozone-nonattainment areas.TPF
16
FPT  Similarly, Greenstone [2002] finds that nonattainment 
counties have a lower plant-level growth rate relative to attainment counties. To control for the 
potential regulatory effect on refinery investments, we also make use of the data on air quality 
attainment status, and in particular, focus on the ozone attainment status.  Ozone is a major 
component of smog and is formed by the reaction of volatile organic compounds (VOC) and 
nitrogen oxides (NOx).  The refining industry emits both VOC and NOx and is ranked first and 
second, respectively, among 18 air polluting industries by the EPA [2004].  A dummy variable is 
constructed that is equal to 1 if a refinery is located in an ozone-nonattainment county in a 
particular year and zero otherwise. Since refineries located in ozone nonattainment areas are 
subject to stricter regulations which may require extra investment in pollution abatement 
associated with a capacity expansion project or a longer time to get a permit for their expansion 
plans, we expect the ozone-nonattainment variable to have a negative sign in the estimated hazard.  
To control for the unobserved heterogeneity, we also applied Heckman and Singer’s 
[1984] approach by allowing the intercept term φ in the hazard function (4) to differ. We model 
the distribution of the φ by a discrete distribution of Z mass points. Each mass point has 
probability αBz
B. The hazard function for a spell belonging to type z is: 
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Equations (4) and (5) are estimated using maximum likelihood methods.  
 
UEmpirical Results 
Table I reports the estimation result of equation (4) using the second definition (six months 
lag) of refining margin and uncertainty measures. The results using the first and third definitions 
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PT According to the Clean Air Act and its amendments, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses 
four criteria pollutants -- carbon monoxide (CO), ozone (OB3
B), sulfur dioxide (SOB2
B), and particulate matter – 
as indicator of air quality and establishes national air quality standards for each of them. A county is 
designated ‘nonattainment’ if its air pollution level of a particular pollutant persistently exceeds the 
relevant national standards.    14
of margin and uncertainty measures are very similar and therefore not reported for brevity’s sake. 
The first three columns in Table I present the results from the investment hazard using the relative 
thresholds (0%, 5% and 10%) while the remaining two columns provide the estimates using the 
absolute thresholds (2000 B/D and 4000 B/D). Across all five investment hazards, the estimated 
coefficient on the uncertainty variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating increases 
in uncertainty decrease the probability refiners make new investment. As with any nonlinear 
model, the magnitude of the marginal effect in a complementary log-log model varies with the 
point of evaluation.  Using the five percent threshold as an example, when the other control 
variables are evaluated at their mean values a one standard deviation increase in margin 
uncertainty lowers the hazard rate by about 11 percent.  Alternatively, a one standard deviation in 
uncertainty lowers the hazard by 18 percent when the 4000 B/SD threshold is used. Figures 5A 
and 5B show the shift in the hazard for this one standard deviation change in uncertainty for the 
five percent and 4000 B/SD thresholds.  Comparing the hazard results based on relative 
thresholds to the absolute thresholds, uncertainty has a stronger impact when the absolute 
thresholds are used and for projects that cross the ten percent threshold.  This suggests that 
initiation of larger projects is more sensitive to increased uncertainty. These results on uncertainty 
are consistent with the predications from the ‘real option’ theory that firms delay investment 
when uncertainty is high.  
Looking at the other variables in the hazard, both the refining margin and utilization rate 
variables are generally positive though not always statistically significant in the hazard. The 
hazard is generally lower for smaller refineries indicating longer durations between investment 
episodes and this is especially true under the absolute thresholds.  For example, when other 
explanatory variables are evaluated at their mean values a small refinery is 67 percent less likely 
to exit an investment inactivity spell with 2000 B/D investment than a large refinery.  This 
reflects the fact that under the absolute definition an investment of 2000 B/D is quite large for 
small refineries but represents a relatively small investment for large refineries.  This illustrates   15
the key difference between using an absolute and a relative definition.  It changes the distribution 
of spells systematically across the size distribution of refineries -- lengthening the spells of small 
refineries. The variable that identifies whether a refinery is in an ozone nonattainment area has 
the expected sign although is only statistically significant under the five percent threshold.  
The duration dummies in Table I indicate that the hazard falls for the first three years 
following an investment episode, it then remains relatively flat, although there is some variation 
across thresholds. For example, in the 2000 B/SD case, the hazard bumps in the eighth year after 
an investment, but the overall shape after the third year is essentially flat. The pattern can also be 
seen in Figures 5A and 5B for the five percent and 4000 B/SD thresholds. A likelihood ratio test 
of the restriction that sets all the duration dummies equal to zero in each of the five models 
presented in Table I rejects the null hypothesis that all the duration dummies are jointly zero for 
all five models.   
However, the previous literature (e.g., CHP [1999]) has noted that the shape of the hazard 
can be quite sensitive to the modeling of the unobserved heterogeneity in the data. Table II 
presents the estimation results of equation (5) when the unobserved heterogeneity is controlled 
for by allowing the intercept term to vary with a discrete distribution of mass points.  The effect 
of uncertainty on the hazard is somewhat weaker in these models both in terms of magnitude and 
statistical significance.  In addition, the shape of the hazards generated from the model with 
heterogeneity varies more across models.  Three out of the five models have a downward slope 
but the remaining two (ten percent and 4000 B/SD thresholds) are essentially flat. In Figure 6A 
and 6B we plot the hazard curves for the five percent and 4000 B/SD cases allowing the 
intercepts to vary by our estimates of the mass points.  For the five percent case, the shape of the 
hazard (Figure 6A) clearly mirrors the shape in Figure 5. In the case of 4000 B/SD threshold, the 
hazard rate for the first three years is not significantly higher than other years. It flattens out 
almost immediately after an investment. The estimated coefficients for other variables are largely 
consistent with Table I. Comparing the log likelihoods in Table I and Table II, the log likelihood   16
improves little with the inclusion of the mass points. This may be due to the fact that the 
heterogeneity is less prominent in a well-defined industry like oil refining and that the inclusion 
of explanatory variables already controls for refinery-level heterogeneity. Cameron and Trivedi 
[2005] suggest the use of a penalized likelihood criterion for model selection, with a high penalty 
for more parameters.TPF
17
FPT  We report the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) in the last rows of 
Table I & 2.  A lower BIC indicates a preferred specification.  Based on this test, the model with 
discrete heterogeneity is clearly favored only in the 4000 B/SD case.  
Our data and the results in Tables I and II appear to be largely consistent with an 
environment where irreversibility is an important characteristic of the investment process.TPF
18
FPT  First, 
the timing of investment is affected by uncertainty as predicted by the Dixit and Pindyck [1994] 
model.  This framework emphasizes the importance of the irreversibility in the investment 
process.  Second, the lumpy pattern of investment observed in the refining industry is also in line 
with the irreversibility story.  Finally, the shape of the hazard, while sensitive to the choice of 
specification, is generally consistent with irreversibility.  A declining hazard could arise in 
models where either irreversibility or convex adjustment cost are present. However, given the 
large number of inaction spells and the significant uncertainty-investment relationship, we believe 
it is irreversibility rather than a convex cost story that best explains our data. In models that 
incorporate heterogeneity through the estimation of mass points, the results regarding the shape of 
the hazard are less clear.  In specifications where the threshold is high (ten percent or 4000 B/SD 
thresholds), the hazard is essentially flat.  Perhaps one interpretation is that a refiner may need to 
bear significant fixed costs, especially in terms of lost output, when undertaking a larger 
investment project.  The flat hazards could be consistent with a model that incorporates both the 
                                                 
TP
17
PT Cameron and Trivedi [2005] report on work by Baker and Melino [2000] that examines the issue of 
overparameterization in discrete duration models with unobserved heterogeneity.  Baker and Melino [2000] 
show that overparameterization of the unobserved heterogeneity leads to bias in the estimated coefficients 
for the explanatory variables and spurious duration dependence.   
TP
18
PT Bloom [2007] estimates a dynamic model of investment and finds an important role for irreversibility in 
explaining the patterns of capital adjustment in Compustat data.   17
irreversibility (a downward sloping hazard) and fixed cost components (an upward sloping 
hazard).TPF
19
FPT The two competing forces could yield a flat hazard.  
In addition to our main results presented above, we also estimate a model with an 
alternative measure of aggregate industry investment uncertainty. Table III present the results of a 
model where we replace the refining margin measure of uncertainty with a stock market index 
based measure of uncertainty (XOI uncertainty). The XOI uncertainty is constructed from the oil 
index (symbol: XOI) which is designed to represent the financial performance of publicly traded 
oil companies. XOI is comprised of 13 major oil companies (including independent refiners) and 
traded at the American Stock Exchange (AMEX).  Similar to the refining margin uncertainty, 
XOI uncertainty is the annual standard deviation of the daily return of this oil index.  Across 
alternative thresholds, there is no statistically significant effect of stock market uncertainty on the 
capacity expansion decision.  One interpretation of this weak correlation is that the share of an oil 
company’s profits derived from refinery operations is relatively small and that the majority of the 
fluctuations in the XOI are due to fluctuations in the profitability of the explorations and 
production divisions of the integrated oil companies.  Moreover, the XOI only reflects the large 
producers but many of our refineries are owned by smaller public and nonpublic companies. 
Our last set of estimates replaces the capacity expansion definition of an event with a 
capacity change definition.  Under this definition a spell can end because of a capacity expansion 
event that exceeds the threshold or a contraction event that exceeds the negative of the threshold.   
Table IV reports these results using the same empirical specifications used in Table I.  The main 
results hold from Table I.  The likelihood of making a capacity change falls as uncertainty 
increases and the shape of the hazard is downward sloping.  The uncertainty results are robust 
across the different thresholds. Most of the other variables are not statistically significant with the 
exception of the indicator variable on refining size.  The small refinery indicator now becomes 
                                                 
TP
19
PT The presence of a mix of fixed and convex adjustment costs is explored in CH [2006] and they find 
evidence that a model that incorporates both types of adjustments fit the data best. 
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positive and statistically significant under the five percent and ten percent thresholds, but remains 
negative under absolute thresholds.  This contrasts dramatically to the results in Table I to III 
where the small refinery dummy had a negative effect in all the estimated models.    This varying 
pattern in the size effects is likely due to the treatment of refinery closures.  In the analysis 
presented in Tables I to III, refinery closings were treated as censored observations. In the models 
presented in Table IV, refinery closings now end inactivity spells.  Figure 2 shows the spike of 
refinery closings in the data on the far left side of the chart.  This leftmost bar represents largely 
small refineries.  The implication is that small refinery closings make up a larger fraction of the 
five percent and ten percent spells compared to the 2000 B/SD and 4000 B/SD definitions where 
there are a larger number of spells.  However, even under the 2000 B/SD and 4000 B/SD 
thresholds, the magnitude of the refinery size parameter is greatly reduced in comparison to the 
results presented in Table I.  
 
V. Conclusion 
There are two main measurement contributions of the paper. First, the paper uses data on 
changes in the actual capacity of refineries to measure investment episodes.  We believe that 
these data offer a cleaner assessment of the capital stock changes of producers than those based 
on accounting data.  Second, the paper uses forward measures from financial markets on 
commodities to construct estimates of market uncertainty.  These measures of commodity price 
uncertainty reflect uncertainties in both input and output prices faced by the refiner.   
Using these data, we examine how refiners’ investment decisions are influenced by market-
level uncertainty.  Empirically, a one standard deviation increase in the margin uncertainty 
measure reduces the probability of investment by 11% under the 5% investment threshold (Table 
I). This finding, along with capital adjustment patterns that are present in the data, appears most 
consistent with an environment where irreversibility is important.  Our results generally conform 
to the predications that arise from the real-options approach developed by Dixit and Pindyck   19
[1994] where both irreversibility and uncertainty play key roles.   In particular, as uncertainty in 
the refining margin rises, refiners delay their investment decisions.  The paper, therefore, 
provides evidence of the wait-and-see response of investment to a rise in uncertainty in a setting 
where the timing of investment projects is measured in a relatively clean fashion.  
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Figure 1  

































































































Data Source: Petroleum Supply Annual of EIA, various issues. This figure depicts the number of refineries 





































































































































































Note: The capacity change variable on the horizontal axis is defined as the capacity change relative to each 
refinery’s capacity at the end of last year. Each bar shows the percent of refinery-year observations with the 
depicted capacity change rate. The far left bar (-1) represents refinery closures.    
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Figure 3 







































































































































Refining Margin Margin Uncertainty
 
Note: The refining margin and margin uncertainty in this figure are, respectively, the mean and standard 
deviation of the daily forward refining margin of equation (1) from July 1 of year t-1 to June 30 of year t. 
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Mean Uncertainty Mean Uncertainty + Std
 
 
Note: This figure depicts the investment hazard rates at mean uncertainty and at mean plus one standard 










123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 > = 1 3





























123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 > = 1 3















Note: This graph depicts the hazard curve estimated from equation (5) with two mass points. Type 1 and 
type 2 correspond to φB1
B and φB2
B respectively.    
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Table I   Investment Hazard Results 
  Relative Thresholds (%)   Absolute Size Thresholds 






























































































































































































Log L  -1457.84  -1016.53  -665.82  -1237.02  -971.205 
BIC  3126.38 2243.76 1542.34 2684.74 2153.11 
No.  Spells  835 537 400 700 571 
Notes: (1) The model is estimated using a complementary log-log function. (2) n=3307. (3) Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. (4)*** (**, *) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. (5) D2-D13 are indicator variables that 
measure spell length in years. (6) Controls for refining districts are not reported.    
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Table II  Investment Hazard Results with Heterogeneity  
  Relative Thresholds (%)  Absolute Size Thresholds 













































































































































































































Log  L  -1455.03  -1016.49 -661.60 -1234.11 -965.14 
BIC  3128.86 2251.78 1542.00 2687.02 2149.08 
No.  of  Spells  835 537 400 700 571 
Notes: (1) The hazard model is estimated using the Heckman-Singer approach including two mass points (φ’s). (2) 
n=3307. (2) Standard errors are in parenthesis. (3)*** (**, *) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. (4) D2-
D13 are indicator variables that measure spell length in years. (5) Controls for refining districts are not reported.    
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Table III   Investment Hazard Results with XOI Uncertainty  
  Relative Thresholds (%)  Absolute Size Thresholds 




























































































































































































Log  L  -1461.8951  -1017.78 -667.723 -1241.69  -975.93 
BIC  3134.49 2246.26 1546.14 2694.08 2162.56 
No.  of  Spells  835 537 400 700 571 
Notes: (1) The model is estimated using a complementary log-log function. (2) n=3307. (3) Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. (4)*** (**, *) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. (5) D2-D13 are indicator variables that 
measure spell length in years. (6) Controls for refining districts are not reported.    
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Table IV    Hazard Results with Capacity Change Definition 
  Relative Thresholds (%)   Absolute Size Thresholds 






























































































































































































Log  L  -1773.17  -1306.36 -961.29 -1549.73 -961.29 
BIC  3757.04 2823.42 2133.28 3310.16 2133.28 
No.  of  Spells  957 600 443 781 635 
 Notes: (1) The model is estimated using a complementary log-log function. (2) n=3307. (3) Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. (4)*** (**, *) denotes significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. (5) D2-D13 are indicator variables that 





 Mean  Std.  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Utilization Rate (%)  86.98  7.66  60.71  102.80 
Refining  Margin  ($/B) 4.723 0.637 3.570 6.046 
Refining Margin 
Uncertainty, ($/B)  0.594 0.239 0.220 1.237 
XOI  Uncertainty  (%)  1.137 0.381 0.621 2.142 
                     
 
 